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Abstract
We study the relationship between a multinational corporation (MNC) and a domestic
firm under demand uncertainty. The MNC possesses a superior production technology, but
the domestic firm is better at predicting market demand. We examine how the MNC’s
preference for, and the ownership structure of, a joint venture depend on the credit market,
demand uncertainty, the domestic firm’s ability to gather demand information, the MNC’s
technology advantage, and the efficiency of technology transfer. We also consider a dynamic
setting with technology spillover and show that whether technology spillover hinders or
facilitates joint venture depends on the nature of the credit market.

JEL Classification: F23, L24, D86.
Keywords: International joint venture, MNC, demand uncertainty, technology spillover,
credit market, principal-agent.
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Introduction

International joint ventures (IJV) between companies in developing and industrialized countries have been an increasingly important business phenomenon. Miller et al. (1997) studied
76 IJVs in six developing countries. They found that more than 65% of the foreign companies
chose domestic partners because of their knowledge of local politics, government regulations,
local custom, and local markets, and more than 70% of the domestic firms in developing
countries sought IJV with multinationals for their superior technology. However, it is frequently argued that the risk of technology spillover in developing countries hinders foreign
direct investment and causes multinational corporations to prefer wholly-owned subsidiaries
to IJVs in developing countries (Mansfield, 1994). In this paper, we formally study the effect
of production technology, market information, and technology spillover on the formation of
IJVs in developing countries.
We consider a simple model consisting of two firms: a multinational corporation
(MNC) and a domestic firm. The firms produce a homogeneous product with uncertain
market demand. The MNC possesses a superior production technology as compared to
the technology of the domestic firm. However, the domestic firm can imperfectly predict
the market demand through costly and non-contractable information gathering. We study
the MNC’s preference between forming an IJV with the domestic firm and establishing its
own subsidiary to compete with the domestic firm. We show that the MNC’s preference
depends on the nature of domestic credit market, demand uncertainty, the domestic firm’s
ability to gather demand information, the MNC’s technology advantage, and the efficiency
of technology transfer. We also consider a dynamic setting where the domestic firm can
improve its production technology in the second period through forming an IJV with the
MNC in the first period. We study the effect of technology spillover on firms’ profits under
duopoly competition and joint venture, and on the MNC’s preference.
When the credit market in the developing country is perfect, the MNC’s decision
1

depends on the production technology of the IJV, i.e., the efficiency of technology transfer.
When the technology transfer is perfect, the MNC always prefers IJV to duopoly competition.
However, when technology transfer is imperfect, the MNC may prefer duopoly competition
when the domestic firm’s production technology is significantly inferior. In a joint venture,
the MNC charges the domestic firm a lump-sum payment but offers it the entire profits of
the IJV.1 The domestic firm’s ability to gather information increases its expected profits in
the IJV but has no effect on the MNC’s profits.
When the credit market in the developing country is imperfect, the MNC’s preference
for IJV depends on demand uncertainty, the domestic firm’s access to credit and its ability
to gather demand information. When the domestic firm’s access to credit is severely constrained, the MNC prefers an IJV if the market uncertainty and the domestic firm’s ability to
gather information are either sufficiently low or sufficiently high. Otherwise, the MNC may
prefer duopoly competition even if the technology transfer is perfect. In an IJV, the MNC
charges the domestic firm a lump-sum payment and offers it a share of the IJV’s profits. The
domestic firm’s share in the IJV profits increase as its ability to gather information increases.
However, the MNC’s expected profits can either increase or decrease in the domestic firm’s
ability to gather information.
When the domestic firm can improve its production technology in the second period
through forming an IJV with the MNC in the first period, we show that this technology
spillover raises the domestic firm’s reservation profits in the second period but reduces it in
the first period. Consequently, it has no effect on the MNC’s expected profits in an IJV when
the credit market is perfect. When the domestic firm’s access to credit is constrained in both
periods, the technology spillover reduces the MNC’s expected profits in an IJV. However,
the technology spillover raises the MNC’s expected profits when the domestic firm’s access
to credit is constrained in the second period but not in the first period. Thus, our finding
1

This outcome is sometimes called licensing or franchising.
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suggests that technology spillover in developing countries may not always hinder foreign
investments, and can in fact facilitate it.
The importance of IJVs in today’s globalized world has influenced substantial academic research on this issue, and a large theoretical literature has developed. Das (1999)
considers a setting where a risk-neutral MNC and a risk-averse host firm expend efforts to
produce a good in a competitive market. He analyzes the role of moral hazard, differences in
attitude toward cost uncertainty, and the host country’s policy toward the IJV in determining the MNC’s optimal choice among joint venture, subsidiary and licensing. In contrast, we
analyze a risk-neutral MNC’s preference between IJV and duopoly competition with a riskneutral domestic firm. We study the impact of moral hazard as well as demand uncertainty,
the domestic firm’s ability to gather demand information, the MNC’s cost advantage, the
efficiency of technology transfer, and the efficiency of domestic credit market on the MNC’s
decision. Sinha (2001) considers a dynamic setting where the host government imposes a
restriction on foreign equity holdings in the first period but removes the restriction in the
second period. It analyzes the role of the MNC’s setup cost and its private information about
its second period technology on its choice among joint venture, licensing, and wholly-owned
subsidiary. Unlike Sinha (2001) where the firms’ profits are exogenous under all situations,
we analyze the effect of the domestic firm’s information advantage and the MNC’s technology advantage on firms’ profits, and consequently on the MNC’s preference between duopoly
competition and joint venture without government intervention.2 In the dynamic setting,
we analyze the effect of technology spillover on firms’ profits under duopoly competition and
joint venture.
Asiedu and Esfahani (2001), Chan and Hoy (1991) and Lin and Saggi (2004) analyze
the ownership structure of IJV where a MNC and a domestic firm possess complementary
2

In the past countries such as China and India used to allow foreign direct investments only in the form
of IJV, and then put restrictions on foreign equity holdings. This regime has changed quite dramatically
with these countries competing for foreign direct investments with many others. In China, for example,
restrictions on foreign equity holding now applies only to a limited number of industries, and these too,
under WTO rules, will need to be liberalized in the coming years.
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inputs. In Chan and Hoy (1991) and Lin and Saggi (2004), firms cannot directly contract
on their inputs, and they provide inputs non-cooperatively based on the profit-sharing arrangement. These studies show that, in equilibrium, the foreign equity share rises with the
importance of foreign investor assets and declines with the contribution of local assets toward
the project. Government policies and the institutional structure of the country also affect
ownership structure.
Svejnar and Smith (1984) examine the microeconomic behavior of joint ventures established between MNCs and domestic partners in less developed countries. It focuses on
the role of bargain power, transfer pricing, stock ownership and profit shares of the parties,
and the responsiveness of IJVs to national development goals.3 Darrough and Stoughton
(1989) analyze the profit-sharing arrangement in joint ventures as a Bayesian bargaining
game between two parents with incomplete information about each other’s cost functions.
They show that the outcomes call for equal allocation of realized joint venture net profit.
Lee (2004) studies the foreign equity share of international joint ventures in a setting where
a MNC and a domestic firm simultaneously decide their respective equity share and the time
to exercise an irreversible investment project via Nash-bargaining.
In contrast to these studies, we analyze the international joint venture in a principalagent framework. Furthermore, we do not presume the existence of a joint venture. Instead,
our study emphasizes the role of the demand uncertainty, the domestic firm’s information
acquisition, efficiency of technology transfer, domestic credit market, and technology spillover
on the MNC’s preference for joint venture and the ownership structure of joint venture.
Our model also relates to some work on the impact of technology spillover on ownership structure in IJVs. Ethier and Markusen (1996) study a firm’s choice between exporting,
licensing, and acquiring a subsidiary abroad. They show that the firm may prefer costly exporting because of the technology spillover associated with producing abroad. Nakamura
3

Welfare implications of, and government policies toward, IJVs are analyzed in, for example, Farge and
Wells, 1982; Katrak, 1983; Al-Saadon and Das, 1996; Roy Chowdhury and Roy Chowdhury, 2002; Das and
Katayama, 2003; and Tomoda and Kurata, 2004.
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and Xie (1998) study how technology-based firms utilize the ownership share in their foreign
subsidiary as a mechanism to mitigate technology spillover. Consequently, the ownership
share in their foreign subsidiary generally depends on the conditions under which their intangible assets are transferred to IJV as well as on their bargaining power relative to their
domestic partners’. Muller and Schnitzer (2006) analyze the effects of a potential spillover
on technology transfer of a multinational enterprise and on the host country policy. The
potential of technology spillover induces the host country to attract the multinational enterprise with more favorable taxation and infrastructure. Consequently, spillovers must not
always have negative effects on technology transfer and can be efficiency-improving under
certain situation. In contrast to these studies, we show that technology spillover in developing countries may not hinder the formation of IJV, even in the absence of host-government
policy interventions.
Our analysis also relates to several studies on the value of information in agency
problems. Sobel (1993) and Dai et al. (2006) study the principal’s preference regarding the
agent’s access to private information in agency models. In their models, the principal faces a
fundamental trade-off between efficiency and rent extraction: the agent’s better information
improves efficiency but demands more information rents. They show that the principal
always prefers a better informed agent if the agent acquires information after contracting
but may prefer an uninformed agent if the agent acquires information before contracting. In
contrast, we show that the MNC may prefer a less informed domestic firm even though the
information is acquired after contracting.
Lewis and Sappington (1994) study a producer’s preference regarding its buyers’ private information about their tastes. The buyers’ private information enables the producer
to segment the market and charge higher prices to higher-value buyers, but can also provide
rent to buyers. They find the producer prefers buyers to have either the best information
or no information. In our model, improved information for the domestic firm increases the
joint venture’s profits but also increases its reservation profits. Similarly, we show that,
5

when the credit market is imperfect, the MNC prefers the domestic firm to have either best
information or no information. Lewis and Sappington (1997) and Cremer et al. (1998) study
how supply contracts are modified to motivate suppliers’ acquisition of private information.
In contrast, we analyze the impact of information acquisition on the ownership structure of
joint ventures.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the central
elements of our model. Section 3 discusses the outcome in duopoly competition. Section 4
analyzes the MNC’s preference between joint venture and duopoly competition. Section 5
investigates the impact of technology spillover in a dynamic setting. Section 6 summarizes
the results and concludes with future research directions.

2

Technology and Information

A multi-national corporation (MNC) and a domestic firm (firm D) produces a homogeneous
product with an inverse demand function
p=e
a − bq,
where the demand parameter e
a is a binary random variable defined as:

e
a=


 a0 with probability φ


(1)

a1 with probability 1 − φ.

Without loss of generality, we assume that a0 < a1 .
Both firms are risk neutral. The foreign firm has a technology advantage in the sense
that its constant marginal/average cost cm is lower than that of the domestic firm which
is denoted by cd , i.e., cm < cd . At the beginning of each period, both the MNC and the
domestic firm know the distribution of e
a. However, the domestic firm has an information
advantage in the sense that with efforts it can gather information to update its knowledge
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on e
a before production actually takes place. To be more specific, if the domestic firms
puts in an effort level of e, with probability µ(e) = αe, it discovers the realization of e
a;
but, with probability 1 − µ(e), it obtains no further information on e
a. α is a parameter
measuring the domestic firm’s efficiency in collecting information. The cost of the domestic
firm’s information gathering is C = e2 /2. However, the effort in gathering information is not
observable and is a private information.
Having described the two firms and their relative advantages in costs and information,
we shall now, before describing the joint-venture equilibrium, describe the benchmark model
which will give us the reservation profit levels for the two firms.

3

The Benchmark: Duopoly Competition

Suppose the two firms engage in a two-stage Cournot competition. In the first stage, the
domestic firm gathers demand information, and then in the second stage, the two firms
compete on outputs, given their information on the demand condition.
In order to obtain a sub-game perfect equilibrium, we work with backward induction,
starting with the second stage. In the second stage, the domestic firm’s output strategy
depends on its information on the demand parameter. First, when it fails to discover the
realization of the demand parameter which has a probability of 1 − µ(e), it makes its output
decision based upon its prior belief on e
a and on the MNC’s output strategy. In this case,
the domestic firm’s optimization problem is the following:
M ax π d = [a − b(q d + q m ) − cd ] q d ,

(2)

qd

where a = E[e
a] = φa0 + (1 − φ)a1 , and q d and q m are the output levels of the domestic and
the multi-national firm respectively. This optimization problem gives us the domestic firm’s
optimal output response function as q d = (a − bqm − cd )/(2b).

7

Second, when the domestic firm discovers the realization of e
a, its optimization problem
is the following:


M ax πdi = ai − b(qdi + q m ) − cd qdi ,

(3)

qdi

where i = 0, 1 denotes the realization of the demand parameter – a0 and a1 respectively.
In this case, the domestic firm’s optimal output response is qdi = (ai − bq m − cd )/(2b) for
i = 0, 1.
The MNC chooses an output level to maximize its expected profits based upon its
prior belief on e
a and on the domestic firm’s output strategy. In particular, its optimization
problem is the following:
M ax π m = {a − b[q m + (1 − µ(e))q d + µ(e)(φqd0 + (1 − φ)qd1 )] − cm }q m ,

(4)

qm

where q m + (1 − µ(e))q d + µ(e)(φqd0 + (1 − φ)qd1 ) is the expected value of the domestic firm’s
output.
Consequently, the MNC’s optimal output response is q m = {a − b[(1 − µ(e))q d +
µ(e)(φqd0 + (1 − φ)qd1 )] − cm }/(2b).
Therefore, at the equilibrium, both firms’ output levels (under different scenarios) are
the following:
qd =

a − 2cd + cm
,
3b

(5)

qd0 =

3a0 − a − 4cd + 2cm
,
6b

(6)

qd1 =

3a1 − a − 4cd + 2cm
, and
6b

(7)

qm =

a − 2cm + cd
.
3b

(8)

At the equilibrium, both firms’ outputs increase in (expected) demand condition and
their competitors’ marginal costs, but decrease in their own marginal costs. The domestic
8

firm’s output depends on the expected demand condition when it fails to discover the demand
condition, but varies with the demand condition when it successfully discovers the demand
condition. Without loss of generality, we assume cd 6 (3a0 − a + 2cm )/4 so that both firms
will produce under all demand conditions. Formally,

cd 6 (3a0 − a + 2cm )/4.

Assumption 1

The domestic firm’s equilibrium profits depend on its information and the demand
conditions. First, when it fails to discover the demand condition, its expected equilibrium
profit is
πd =

(a − 2cd + cm )2
.
9b

(9)

Second, when it discovers the realization of demand parameter to be e
a = a0 , its profit is
πd0 =

(3a0 − a − 4cd + 2cm )2
,
36b

(10)

and finally when it discovers the realization of demand parameter to be e
a = a1 , its profit is:
πd1 =

(3a1 − a − 4cd + 2cm )2
.
36b

(11)

The expected equilibrium profit for the MNC is
πm =

(a − 2cm + cd )2
.
9b

(12)

This completes the second stage. In the first stage, the domestic firm chooses its
effort level in information gathering based upon its expectation of equilibrium profits in the
second stage. Its optimization problem is as follows:
M ax πd = µ(e)(φπd0 + (1 − φ)πd1 ) + (1 − µ(e))π d − e2 /2,
e

where π d , πd0 and πd1 are given in (9), (10) and (11) respectively and µ(e) = αe.
9

(13)

The solution of the optimal level of effort in the above problem is given by:
e =
Var(e
a) =

αVar(e
a)
, where
4b

(14)

φa20 + (1 − φ)a21 − a2 .

We define the value of information, V , as the difference between the domestic firm’s
profits when information gathering is successful and when it is unsuccessful. Hence,
V = (φπd0 + (1 − φ)πd1 ) − π d = Var(e
a)/(4b).

(15)

The domestic firm’s maximum profit under duopoly competition, therefore, is
πd = π d + α2 [φa20 + (1 − φ)a21 − a2 ]2 /(32b2 ),
or,

πd = π d + α2 V 2 /2.

(16)

Therefore, the benefit of the domestic firm’s superior information on demand condition is
increasing in α and Var(e
a).

Proposition 1 Under duopoly competition, the domestic firm’s expected profit increases as
the demand condition becomes more uncertain or the firm becomes more efficient in gathering
information; however, the MNC’s expected profit depends on neither the demand uncertainty
nor the domestic firm’s ability to gather information.

The intuition is the following. The domestic firm’s information on demand condition
enables it to adjust its output downward when demand is low and upward when demand
is high. Consequently, the domestic firm’s gain in profit when the demand is high more
than compensates its loss in profit when demand is low. Therefore, the domestic firm’s
profit is increasing and convex in the realization of demand condition., and its expected
profit increases as the demand becomes more uncertain. As the domestic firm becomes more
efficient in gathering information, it obtains the demand information more often for any
given level of effort, which increases its expected profit. On the other hand, the MNC’s
10

output decision is based on its expectation of demand condition and cannot vary with the
realization of demand condition.. Consequently, its profit is increasing and linear with respect
to the realization of demand condition. The domestic firm’s information has two opposite
effects on the MNC’s expected profit: the domestic firm softens the competition by reducing
output when demand is low and toughens the competition by raising output when demand
is high. These two opposing effects turn out to offset each other. Moreover, as the demand
uncertainty increases, so does the magnitude of these two effects. Consequently, the demand
uncertainty and the domestic firm’s information have no effect on the MNC’s expected
profit.4

4

Joint Venture

Having described the duopoly equilibrium, we are now in a position develop the international
joint venture (IJV) equilibrium. We shall set it up in a principal-agent framework, with the
MNC being the principal and the domestic firm as the agent.
As for the technology, we assume that in the joint venture, the marginal cost of
production is a linear combination of the MNC’s and the domestic firm’s original marginal
costs, i.e.,
cj = θcm + (1 − θ)cd ,
where θ ∈ [0, 1] measures the efficiency of technology transfer.
Since the domestic firm’s effort in information gathering is unobservable to the MNC,
the two firms cannot contract on the domestic firm’s effort in gathering information. Consequently, the MNC must offer the domestic firm a contract to induce the latter’s effort in
information gathering. The timing of the model is the following:
4

Basar and Ho (1976), Ponssard (1979), Novshek and Sonnenschein (1982), Vives (1984), and Hwang
(1993) study firms’ incentives to acquire and disclose information on the demand function in an oligopolistic
market. They show that the acquisition of such information is always beneficial to the firms and not disclosing
information is a dominant strategy for each firm in Cournot compeition when the goods are subsititutes.
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1. The MNC offers a contract {T, s} to the domestic firm, specifying the domestic firm’s
ex ante lump-sum payment to the MNC T (which can be negative) and the MNC’s
share of profit s.
2. The domestic firm decides whether to accept or reject the contract.
3. The nature determines the demand condition in the market.
4. The domestic firm gathers information on demand conditions.
5. The IJV determines the output level and production takes place.
6. Profits of the IJV are distributed between the two parties based on the contract.

The optimization problem for the IJV depends whether the domestic firm succeeds or
fails to discover the demand condition. When the domestic firm fails to discover the demand
condition, the IJV’s optimization problem is
M ax π j = (a − bq j + cj )q j ,
qj

(17)

and in this case it can be shown that the join venture’s maximum profit is π j = (a−cj )2 /(4b).
When the domestic firm discovers the realization of the demand condition, the IJV’s
optimization problem is
M ax πji = [ai − bqji − cj ] qji ,

(18)

qji

where i = 0, 1. In this case, the joint venture’s maximum profit is πj0 = (a0 − cj )2 /(4b) if
e
a = a0 , and πj1 = (a1 − cj )2 /(4b) if e
a = a1 .
Before establishing the optimal contract, it may be useful to derive the first best, and
this we do in the next subsection.

12

4.1

The first-best solution

As a reference point, we first consider the optimal solution when the MNC can observe
and contract on the domestic firm’s effort in information gathering. In this case, the MNC
can specify the amount of effort in information gathering in the contract. The MNC’s
optimization problem is
M ax Πm = s[µ(e)(φπj0 + (1 − φ)πj1 ) + (1 − µ(e))π j ] + T

(19)

T,s,e

subject to
(1 − s)[µ(e)(φπj0 + (1 − φ)πj1 ) + (1 − µ(e))π j ] − T − e2 /2 > πd ,

(20)

where πd is defined in (16).
Constraint (20), which requires the domestic firm’s expected profits in the IJV to
be no less than its maximum expected profit under duopoly competition, guarantees the
domestic firm’s participation in the contract.
In the optimal solution we must have:
e∗ = α[(φπj0 + (1 − φ)πj1 ) − π j ] = αV.

(21)

The MNC offers the domestic firm a combination of s and T which drives the latter’s
profit to its reservation level. Substituting T from (20) (with equality) into (19) and using
(21), we can obtain the MNC’s maximum profits to be π j + µ(e∗ )[(φπj0 + (1 − φ)πj1 ) −
π j ] − α2 V 2 /2 − πd = π j + α2 V 2 /2 − πd . Thus, the domestic firm’s and the MNC’s profits,
respectively, are
Π∗d = πd = π d + α2 V 2 /2, and

(22)

Π∗m = π j + α2 V 2 /2 − πd = π j − π d ..

(23)
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4.2

The Optimal Contract

We now describe the optimal contract when the MNC cannot observe the domestic firm’s
effort in information gathering. Since the MNC cannot observe and contract on the domestic
firm’s effort in information gathering, it can no longer specify the effort level in a contract.
The MNC’s optimization is
M ax Πm = s[µ(e)(φπj0 + (1 − φ)πj1 ) + (1 − µ(e))π j ] + T

(24)

T,s,e

subject to
(1 − s)[µ(e)(φπj0 + (1 − φ)πj1 ) + (1 − µ(e))π j ] − T − e2 /2 > πd ,

(25)

e = arg max{(1 − s)[µ(e)(φπj0 + (1 − φ)πj1 ) + (1 − µ(e))π j ] − T − e2 /2},

(26)

T 6 W,

(27)

e

where π is defined after (17), πj0 and πj1 after (18), and W is the domestic firm wealth level
including what it can borrow.
Constraint (25) guarantees the domestic firm’s participation in the contract. Constraint (26) determines the domestic firm’s effort in information gathering for a given contract. The third constraint (27) states the fact that the amount of ex ante payment is limited
by the domestic firm’s borrowing/wealth constraint.
From constraint (26), we get
e = α(1 − s)[(φπj0 + (1 − φ)πj1 ) − π j ] = (1 − s)αV.

(28)

Substituting the above solution for e into the MNC’s optimization problem, the
MNC’s optimization problem can be reduced to:
M ax Πm = s[π j + (1 − s)α2 V 2 ] + T
T,s

14

(29)

subject to
(1 − s)[π j + (1 − s)α2 V 2 ] − T − (1 − s)2 α2 V 2 /2 > πd ,

(30)

T 6 W.

(31)

The properties of the optimal contract would depend on whether the domestic firm’s
borrowing constraint is binding or not. We shall now consider these two cases in turn

4.2.1

Case 1: Perfect Credit Market

First, we consider the case where the domestic firm has unrestricted access to the credit
market, i.e., constraint (31) is not binding. In this case, the optimal contract is given by
s = 0;

and

(32)

T = πj − πd.

(33)

In the optimal contract, the MNC maximizes its profit by charging the domestic firm
an ex ante payment which equals the MNC’s profits under the first-best, but offering the
domestic firm the entire profits of the joint venture.5 The domestic firm’s effort level is
e = (1 − s)αV = αV = e∗ . Therefore, the domestic firm delivers the first-best level of effort
in information gathering and achieves the first-best profits for the IJV.
The MNC’s and the domestic firm’s profits in this case are respectively:
Πm = π j − π d , and

(34)

Πd = πd = π d + α2 V 2 /2.

(35)

Under the optimal contract, the domestic firm receives its reservation profits – its
profits under duopoly competition, and the MNC receives the first-best profits of the joint
venture minus the domestic firm’s reservation profits.
5

This contract can be called licensing or franchising.
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We now examine how the contract changes as the efficiency level of the domestic
firm’s information gathering — represented by the parameter α — increases. Since πd =
π d + α2 V 2 /2 (see (16)) where π d is given in (9), it should be clear that an increase in α
increases the domestic firm’s profits, but has no effect on the MNC’s profits. This is because
the domestic firm’s ability to gather information increases the joint venture’s profits and the
domestic firm’s reservation profits by the same amount. Consequently, the MNC’s profits
does not depend on the domestic firm’s ability to gather information. We summarize these
results in Proposition 2 (the formal proof is given in appendix A).

Proposition 2 When the credit market is perfect, the MNC charges the domestic firm a
fixed payment only and the domestic firm receives the entire profit of the joint venture. The
domestic firm’s ability to gather information increases its own profit but has no effect on the
MNC’s profit.

The MNC however may not take part in the IJV if its profits under IJV is lower than
that under duopoly. In Proposition 3 we show that when the technology transfer is perfect,
i.e., θ = 1, the MNC would prefer IJV to duopoly (appendix B has the proof). Formally:

Proposition 3 Under perfect credit markets, the MNC always prefers a joint venture to
duopoly competition when the technology transfer is perfect.

Next we derive a sufficient condition under which the MNC would still prefer IJV
over duopoly even when technology transfer is completely absent, i.e., θ = 0. This sufficient
condition also guarantees that IJV is the preferred option for the MNC for all values of
θ. However, if this sufficient condition is not satisfied, the there exists a critical value of
cd , say c̃d , such IJV is preferable to the MNC if cd ≤ c̃d , and duopoly is preferable if
c̃d ≤ cd (≤ (3a0 − a + 2cm )/4, because of assumption 1). These results are formally stated
in proposition 4 below (the proof is given in appendix C).
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Proposition 4 Under perfect credit markets and inefficient technology transfer, the MNC
always prefers IJV to duopoly competition for all values of θ if ∆ ≡ [a + a0 − 2cm ]2 +
[a − a0 ]2 − [5a − 3a0 − 2cm ]2 /4 < 0. If ∆ ≥ 0, then there exists a critical value of cd ,
c̃d (≤ (3a0 − a + 2cm )/4), such that the MNC prefers IJV to duopoly when cd < c̃d , and
duopoly to IJV when c̃d ≤ cd . Furthermore, the critical value of cd , c̃d , is an increasing
function of the technology transfer parameter θ.

Note that when cm ' 0, 4∆ = −17a2 − (a0 )2 + 30aa0 which is positive when the
difference between a and a0 is small (p ' 1), and is negative when the difference between a
and a0 is large, say a = 2a0 .
The intuition behind Propositions 3 and 4 is the following. The formation of a joint
venture eliminates the competition under duopoly. Therefore, the MNC always prefers joint
venture to duopoly competition if the technology transfer is perfect. However, when the technology transfer is imperfect, the MNC faces the trade-off between less competition and higher
cost of production. When the domestic firm’s production cost increases, the MNC’s benefit
from less competition reduces and the IJV’s cost of production increases. Consequently, the
MNC prefers duopoly competition to joint venture if the domestic firm’s production cost is
sufficiently large.

4.2.2

Case 2: Binding Borrowing Constraint

When the credit constraint is binding, the domestic firm’s ability to make an ex ante payment
is constrained by its access to credits, W , and the MNC cannot charge the domestic firm
the same amount of ex ante payment as in the case perfect credit market. In this case, the
MNC’s optimal offer to the domestic firm a mixed contract: it charges the domestic firm an
ex ante payment and it also offers the domestic firm a share of the joint venture’s profits.
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Under the optimal contract:
p
(π j )2 + 2α2 V 2 (W + πd ) − π j
s = 1−
> 0;
α2 V 2

and

T = W.

(36)
(37)

Note that s in (36) is positive since W < π j − π d . Note that π j − π d is the amount of
payment in the case of perfect credit markets (see (33)), i.e., a binding borrowing constraint
implies that the maximum level of borrowing is less than the amount the domestic firm
borrowed in the case of perfect credit markets.
The MNC’s and the domestic firm’s profits are respectively
Πm = s[π j + (1 − s)α2 V 2 ] + W ;

and

Πd = πd = π d + α2 V 2 /2.

(38)
(39)

Thus, under the optimal contract, the domestic firm still receives its reservation profits
— its profits under duopoly competition, as was the case under perfect credit markets and
the first best. However, under profit-sharing, the domestic firm’s effort is e = (1 − s)αV <
αV = e∗ , i.e., the domestic firm delivers less than the first-best level of efforts in information
gathering.6 Consequently, the profit of the joint venture is below the first-best level and the
MNC receives a smaller profits than in the case of perfect credit markets.
Since ∂s/∂W < 0 according to (36), it follows that the MNC gives a smaller share
of the joint venture profits to the domestic firm, and receives a smaller ex ante lump-sum
payment from it, as the domestic firm’s access to credits worsens, i.e., as W decreases. A
smaller share of profits for the domestic firm further reduces the domestic firm’s efforts in
gathering information and therefore further reduces the joint venture’s profits. Consequently,
the MNC’s profit declines as the domestic firm’s access to credits worsens. We summarize
these findings in Proposition 5 (a formal proof can be found in appendix D).
6

Note that the optimum effort level under perfect credit markets is the first-best level.
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Proposition 5 When borrowing constraint is binding, the MNC receives an ex ante lumpsum payment plus a share of the joint venture’s profit. The domestic firm receives its reservation profits and delivers less than the first-best level of efforts. The MNC receives a smaller
profits as compared to the case of perfect credit markets, and its profits decline as the domestic
firm’s access to credit worsens.

When the borrowing constraint is not binding, an increase in the efficiency level of
the domestic firm’s information gathering — represented by the parameter α — increases
its reservation profits and the joint venture’s profits by the same amount. Consequently,
the MNC’s profits do not depend on the parameter α (see proposition 2). However in the
present case where the MNC receives a positive share of the IJV profits, an increase in α
has two opposite effects on the MNC’s profits. On one hand, it increases the domestic firm’s
reservation profits, and this reduces the MNC’s share of profits. On the other hand, a higher
efficiency of information gathering together with a resultant larger share of profits for the
domestic firms, provides it with more incentive to gather information and therefore to raise
the joint venture’s profits. When α2 V 2 < π j , the value of information, and consequently
the domestic firm’s share of profits, is relatively small, the former effect dominates the latter
and the MNC’s profit decreases as the domestic firm becomes more efficient in gathering
information; however, when α2 V 2 > π j , the value of information, and therefore the domestic
firm’s share of profits, is relatively large, the latter effect dominates the former and the MNC’s
profit increases as the domestic firm becomes more efficient in gathering information.7 We
present this result in Proposition 6 (proof in appendix E).

Proposition 6 As the domestic firm’s ability to gather information increases, the MNC’s
profit increases when α2 V 2 > π j but decreases when α2 V 2 < π j .
7

Lewis and Sappington (1994) study a producer’s preference regarding its buyers’ private information
about their tastes. Similarlly, they show that the producer prefers buyers to have either the best information
or no information.
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Since the MNC receives a smaller profit when the credit constraint for the domestic
firm is binding, it is no longer true that the MNC always prefers a joint venture to duopoly
competition even when the technology transfer is perfect (θ = 1). The MNC’s preference
depends on the domestic firm’s access to credit, its ability to gather information, and the
market uncertainty. Proposition 7 presents a condition under which the MNC prefers a joint
venture to duopoly competition when the technology transfer is perfect (proof is in appendix
F).

Proposition 7 With binding borrowing constraint and perfect technology transfer, there are
exist 0 < βL ≤ βH such that the MNC always prefers joint venture if α2 V 2 6 βL or α2 V 2 >
βH but may prefer duopoly competition if βL < α2 V 2 < βH . Moreover, βL and βH converge
as the domestic firm’s access to credit increases.

The intuition behind Proposition 7 is the following. When α2 V 2 6 βL , the domestic
firm’s reservation profits as well as its share of IVJ profits are small. In this case, even
though the domestic firm does not have much incentive to gather information, the MNC
prefers a joint venture to duopoly competition simply because the former eliminates competition. However, when βL < α2 V 2 < βH , the domestic firm’s ability to gather information
and therefore its reservation profits are bigger than those in the previous case (α2 V 2 6 βL ).
However, the share of the domestic firm in IJV profits and thus its incentive to gather information are still relatively small. Consequently, the domestic firm’s contributions to the
joint venture via information gathering plus the benefit of less competition cannot compensate for the negative effect of the domestic firm’s high reservation profits on the MNC’s
profits. Therefore, the MNC prefers duopoly competition to a joint venture in this case.
When α2 V 2 > βH , the domestic firm’s ability to gather information and thus its reservation
profits are even higher than those in the previous case (βL < α2 V 2 < βH ), but this time
the domestic firms share in IJV profits is also higher, provides it greater incentive to gather
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information. In this case, the domestic firm’s contribution to the joint venture plus the benefit of less competition more than compensates for the negative effect of the domestic firm’s
high reservation profits on MNC profits, and the MNC prefers a joint venture to duopoly
competition.

5

Technology Spillover

In this section we extend the analysis of the preceding sections by considering a dynamic
setting where the MNC interacts with the domestic firm in two consecutive periods. The
link between the two periods is via possible spillover of technology within a joint venture.
In particular, we assume that the domestic firm can improve its production technology and
reduce its production cost in the second period through forming a joint venture with the
MNC in the first period. This may give rise to the possibility that the domestic firm breaks
away from the IJV at the beginning of the second period and compete with the MNC with
an improved technology. We consider the effect of this type of technology spillover on the
nature of the joint venture.
The domestic firm’s marginal cost of production in the second period is cd − τ ∆c,
where ∆c = cd − cm and 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1, when it forms a joint venture with the MNC in the first
period. Therefore, τ measures the rate of technology spillover. For simplicity, we assume
the discount rate for both firms to be unity.8
In the absence of technology spillover, the MNC’s overall inter-temporal optimization
problem can be split into two identical optimization problems: one for each period.9 However,
when technology spillover occurs in the joint venture, the MNC’s overall inter-temporal
8

When the discount rates of the two firms are higher than unity, but are the same, all our qualitative
results will hold although the magnitude of the effect of technology spillover on the MNC’s profits will be
smaller. When the domestic firm discounts future profits by more (or less) than what the MNC does, the
spillover, however, will become more costly (or beneficial) for the MNC and therefore the possibility of a
IJV occurring will be lower (higher).
9
Implicitly, we assume that profits of the domestic firm is spent by the end of the first period, and it does
not add to its wealth (W ).
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optimization problem can no longer be split into two identical problems, and we shall now
describe the optimal contract.
First of all note that in the presence of technology spillover, in the second period, the
domestic firm’s reservation profits, i.e., maximum profits under duopoly competition is
πd2 = [a − 2(cd − τ ∆c) + cm ]2 /9b + α2 V 2 /2.

(40)

The inter-temporal optimization problem facing the MNC is
M ax Πm = s1 [π j + (1 − s1 )α2 V 2 ] + T1 + Πm2

(41)

T1 ,s1

subject to
(1 − s1 )[π j + (1 − s1 )α2 V 2 ] − T1 − (1 − S1 )2 α2 V 2 /2 + πd2 ≥ 2πd ,
and

T1 ≤ W1 ,

(42)
(43)

where Πm2 is the maximum value of the MNC’s profits in second period, and is obtained
from the following optimization problem:
M ax Πm2 = s2 [π j + (1 − s2 )α2 V 2 ] + T2

(44)

T2 ,s2

subject to
(1 − s2 )[π j + (1 − s2 )α2 V 2 ] − T2 − (1 − s2 )2 α2 V 2 /2 ≥ πd2 , and

(45)

T2 ≤ W2 .

(46)

Equation (45) is the no-breaking-away or continued-participation constraint. That is,
with this constraint the MNC makes sure that the domestic firm has no incentive to break
away from the IJV. Equation (42) is the overall or inter-temporal participation constraint:
it says that the sum of profits in the two periods for the domestic firm is larger than or
equal to what it would make in the two periods in the absence of IJV, which is two times
22

the duopoly profits with no technology spillover. Note that equation (42) can be rewritten
as
(1 − s1 )[π j + (1 − s1 )α2 V 2 ] − T1 − (1 − S1 )2 α2 V 2 /2 ≥ πd − [πd2 − πd ],
which states that the reservation profits in the first period is πd − [πd2 − πd ], which is less
than πd since πd2 > πd . That is, technology spillover raises the domestic firm’s reservation
profit in the second period, but lowers it in the first period.
The credit or wealth constraints (43) and (46) needs further explanations. Here we
assume that any credit is taken at the beginning of a period and needs to be repaid at
the end of that period. This is different from the usual treatment of credits in two-period
macroeconomic models where credits are typically taken in the first period and is repaid out
of second period’s income.
As in the one-period setting, the MNC’s optimal contract depends on the domestic
firm’s access to credit. When the credit market is perfect the MNC charges an ex ante
payment but offers the domestic firm entire share of the joint venture’s profit. This is true
for both periods. If the credit market is perfect in period 2, then the profits of the MNC
and the domestic firm in period 2 are π j + α2 V 2 /2 − πd2 and πd2 respectively. If the credit
market is perfect in period 1, then the two profits in period 1 are π j + α2 V 2 /2 − [2πd − πd2 ]
and 2πd − πd2 respectively.
When the credit constraint is binding, the situation vis-à-vis the domestic firm’s
profits in the two periods do not change. As for the MNC, if the credit constraint is binding
p
in period 2, its profits are s∗2 [π j +(1−s∗2 )α2 V 2 ]+W2 where s∗2 = 1−( π j + 2α2 V 2 (W2 + πd2 )−
π j )/(α2 V 2 ). Similarly, if the credit constraint is binding in period i, it is s∗1 [π j +(1−s∗1 )α2 V 2 ]
p
+W1 where s∗1 = 1 − ( π j + 2α2 V 2 [W1 + (2πd − πd2 )] − π j )/(α2 V 2 ).
Therefore, the overall effect of technology spillover on the contract depends on the
nature of the domestic firm’s access to credits. We shall consider a number of scenarios in
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relation to the credit market and examine the effect of technology spillover on the MNC’s
total profits.

5.1

Case 1: Perfect Credit Market in Both Periods

In this case, the MNC and the domestic firm’s maximum total profit are Πm = 2[π j +
α2 V 2 /2] − 2πd and Πd = 2πd , respectively. The technology spillover raises the domestic
firm’s reservation profit in the second period but lowers it in the first period. Overall, it
does not affect the domestic firm’s reservation profits for the two periods. Therefore, the
technology spillover has no effect on the MNC’s total profits either.

5.2

Case 2: Binding Credit Constraint in at Least One Period

Suppose the credit market is inefficient in period i, /i = 1, 2. Then profits of the MNC
p
in period i, Πmi , is s∗i [π j + (1 − s∗i )α2 V 2 ] +Wi where s∗i = 1 − ( π j + 2α2 V 2 [Wi + Zi ] −
π j )/(α2 V 2 ) and Zi represents the domestic firm’s reservation profit in period i.
From the above expression for s∗i and using the participation constraints, we get
1
ds∗i
=−
.
dZi
π j + (1 − Si∗ )α2 V 2
Then,
ds∗
dΠmi
= [π j + (1 − 2Si∗ )α2 V 2 ] i
dZi
dZi

(47)

[π j + (1 − 2Si∗ )α2 V 2 ]
.
π j + (1 − Si∗ )α2 V 2

(48)

=−
Therefore,

−1 <

dΠmi
< 0,
dZi

as π j + (1 − 2Si∗ )α2 V 2 > 0.

24

(49)

Thus, one unit increase in the domestic firm’s reservation profits in a period reduces
the MNC’s profit by less than one unit in that period in the presence of binding credit
constraint, and by one unit if the credit market is perfect.
Furthermore,
d2 Πmi
α2 V 2 [π j + α2 V 2 ]
=
−
< 0,
dZi2
[π j + (1 − Si∗ )α2 V 2 ]2

(50)

i.e., the MNC’s profit in period i is convex in Zi . It suggests that the MNC prefers the
domestic firm’s reservation profit to be consistent overtime when the credit constraint is
binding in both periods.
When the credit constraint is binding in period j but not in period i 6= j, given
the domestic firm’s overall reservation profits, the MNC prefers the domestic firm to have
a smaller reservation profit in period i but a larger reservation profit in period j. This is
because a higher reservation profit for the domestic firm helps relax the credit constraint in
period j. As a result, one unit increase in the domestic firm’s reservation profit reduces the
MNC’s profit by one unit in period i but by less than one unit in period j. Therefore, the
technology spillover benefits the MNC when the credit market is perfect in period 1 but not
in period 2, but harms the MNC when the credit market is perfect in period 2 but not so in
period 1. We summarize these finding in Proposition 8.

Proposition 8 Technology spillover has no effect on the MNC’s profits when the credit
markets are perfect in both periods, but reduces the MNC’s profit when the credit constraint
is binding in both periods. Furthermore, the technology spillover increases the MNC’s profit
when the credit market is perfect in period 1 but not so in period 2; and reduces its profit
when the credit constraint is binding in period 1 but not so in period 2.
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6

Conclusion

International joint venture (IJV) is an important and significant mode of foreign direct
investment. Why should a multinational corporation (MNC) seek a joint venture with a
inefficient firm in a developing country? This question is at the heart of the present paper.
The knowledge of local markets by domestic firms and superior technology of the MNE is
thought to be important factors that bring about collaboration between the two parties, with
both parties gaining from each others’ advantages. However, in the theoretical literature,
these two factors have not been considered together to explain the existence of IJVs. This
paper fills this void in the literature.
We do so in the context of a principal-agent framework in which the principal (MNC)
has technology advantage and the agent (the domestic firm) can predict, with some probability, uncertain market demand by spending efforts in non-contractable information gathering,
which the MNE cannot. The levels of reservation profits for both firms are given by their
profits in a duopoly competition. Under this framework, we examine under what scenarios
the MNC would prefer an IJV rather than greenfield foreign direct investment (i.e., duopoly competition), and when an IJV does take place, we characterize the nature of the IJV
contract, under different credit market scenarios.
When the credit market is perfect and the IJV technology is the same as the MNC
technology (the case of perfect technology transfer), the MNC will always prefer IJV to
greenfield investment. When the credit market is perfect, but the IJV technology is significant inferior to the MNC technology, the MNC may prefer duopoly competition to IJV.
When IJV does take place, the IJV contract would involve a lump-sum payment by the
domestic firm who in turn receives the entire profits of the IJV. In this case, domestic firm’s
efficiency in gathering information has no effect on the MNC’s profits.
When the credit constraint is binding, the domestic firm would pay a smaller lump-
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sum payment, but will not receive the entire IJV profits. In this case, the MNC may prefer
duopoly even when the IJV technology is the same as the MNC technology. But, the MNC
would prefer IJV to duopoly competition when the domestic firm’s efficiency in information
gathering is either sufficiently high or sufficiently low. Also, the MNC’s profits may decrease
as the domestic firm becomes more efficient in gathering information.
We also consider a dynamic setting, in which there is spillover of technology and there
is a threat that the domestic firm may break away from the IJV in the second period. We
find that this possibility may not always hinder the formation of an IJV, and sometimes can
even facilitate it.
To summarize, we have found that whether or not IJV takes place, and when it does,
the nature of the IJV contract, would depend on the nature of credit markets and on a
number parameters such as the domestic firm’s efficiency level in information gathering,
demand uncertainty, and the extent of technology transfer in an IJV.
In this paper, we have left out government policies altogether. However, in a future
work we plan to extend the the present analysis by considering government policy interventions.
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Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 2
The Lagrangian of the MNC’s problem is the following:
£ = s[π j + (1 − s)α2 V 2 ] + T + λ1 {(1 − s)π j + (1 − s)2 α2 V 2 /2 − T − πd } + λ2 {W − T }, (A.1)
where λ1 and λ2 are the Lagrangian multipliers for constraints (30) and (31), respectively.
Then the first order conditions are the following:
£s = [π j + (1 − 2s)α2 V 2 ] − λ1 [π j + (1 − s)α2 V 2 ] = 0, and

(A.2)

£T = 1 − λ1 − λ2 = 0.

(A.3)

When constraint (31) is not binding, (A.3) indicates that λ1 = 1 and λ2 = 0. Then
solving (A.2) we get s = 0. From constraint (30), we also find that T = π j + α2 V 2 /2 − πd .
Finally, constraint (31) being not binding requires W > T = π j + α2 V 2 /2 − πd .

Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 3
The MNC strictly prefers joint venture to duopoly competition if
Πm = π j + α2 V 2 /2 − πd > π m , or

(B.1)

(a − 2cm + cd )2 (a − 2cd + cm )2
(a − cj )2
>
+
.
4b
9b
9b

(B.2)

When the technology transfer is perfect, cj = cm and the above condition simplifies
to
(a − cm )2
(a − 2cm + cd )2 + (a − 2cd + cm )2
>
.
4
9

(B.3)

Define ϕ(cd ) ≡ [(a − 2cm + cd )2 + (a − 2cd + cm )2 ]/9. Since ϕ0 (cd ) = (10cd − 2a − 8cm )/9
and ϕ00 (cd ) ≡ 10/9 > 0, ϕ(cd ) is strictly convex in cd and is U-shaped. Furthermore,
ϕ0 |cd =cm = 2(cd − a)/9 < 0 and ϕ|cd =cm = 2(a − cm )2 /9 < (a − cm )2 /4. Thus, the inequality
(B.3) is satisfied at cd = cm .
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It can also be shown that, ϕ0 |cd =(a+cm )/2 = (a − cm )/3 > 0 and ϕ|cd =(a+cm )/2 =
(a − cm )2 /4, which is the left hand side of (B.3). However, from assumption 1 and since
a0 < a1 , we have cm < cd ≤ (3a0 − a + 2cm )/4 < (a + cm )/2. Thus from the shape of the
2

ϕ(cd ) function it follows that ϕ < (a − cm )2 /4 for all cd ∈ [cm , (3a0 − a + 2cm )/4].

Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 4
Define φ(cd ) ≡ (a − 2cm + cd )2 /9 + (a − 2cd + cm )2 /9 − (a − cj )2 /4. Following the proof of
proposition 3, it follows from (B.2) that the MNC would prefer IJV to duopoly competition
if and only if φ(cd ) < 0.
It is easy to verify that φ(cd )|cm =cd = 2(a − cd )2 /9 − (a − cj )2 /4 < 0. Moreover, the
function also has the following property:
18φ0 (cd ) = [−4 + 9(1 − θ)]a − [16 + 9θ(1 − θ)]cm + [20 − 9(1 − θ)]cd ,

(C.1)

18φ00 (cd ) = [20 − 9(1 − θ)] > 0.

(C.2)

Thus, the function φ(cd ) is strictly convex and is either monotonically increasing or
U-shaped. Moreover, since the maximum possible value for cd is (3a0 − a + 2cm )/4 and an
increase in the value of θ decreases the value of φ(cd ) for every level of cd , if we can show
that φ(cd )|cd =(3a0 −a+2cm )/4,

θ=0

< 0, then φ < 0 for all admissible values of θ and cd and we

can say that the MNC will always prefer IJV to duopoly competition. In fact, we have
φ(cd )|cd =(3a0 −a+2cm )/4,

θ=0

= [a + a0 − 2cm ]2 + [a − a0 ]2 − [5a − 3a0 − 2cm ]2 /4 ≡ ∆.

Thus, ∆ < 0 is a sufficient condition for the MNC to prefer IJV over duopoly competition always. If ∆ > 0, then by continuity, there must a critical value of cd , c̃d , such that IJV
is preferable to the MNC if cd ≤ c̃d , and duopoly is preferable if c̃d ≤ cd ≤ (3a0 − a + 2cm )/4.
Moreover, since φ(cd ) decreases with θ for every cd , c̃d increases with θ and as θ is sufficiently
large c̃d becomes inadmissible (greater than (3a0 − a + 2cm )/4).
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Appendix D: Proof of Proposition 5
When the credit constraint is binding, λ2 > 0. From constraint (31), we then get T = W . It
can be shown that constraint (30) is always binding in an optimal contract. As a result, the
domestic firm always receives its reservation profit. Further, from constraint (30) it follows
that
p
s=1−
Since

p

(π j )2 + 2α2 V 2 (W + πd ) − π j
.
α2 V 2

(π j )2 + 2α2 V 2 (W + πd ) − π j > 0, s < 1. Further, s > 0 if W < π j + α2 V 2 /2 − πd .

Finally, d£/dW = λ2 > 0 by use of the Envelope theorem.
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Appendix E: Proof of Proposition 6
From (38), we find
dΠm
ds
ds
= [π j + (1 − s)α2 V 2 ] 2 2 + s[(1 − s) − α2 V 2 2 2 ],
2
2
dα V
dα V
dα V

(E.1)

from (36) we have,
(1 − s)2 − 1
ds
=
< 0.
dα2 V 2
2[π j + (1 − s)α2 V 2 ]

(E.2)

s2 [π j − α2 V 2 ]
dΠm
=
−
.
dα2 V 2
2[π j + (1 − s)α2 V 2 ]

(E.3)

Therefore,

Hence,
dΠm
≷ 0 according as π j ≶ α2 V 2 .
dα2 V 2
2
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Appendix F: Proof of Proposition 7
Suppose the technology transfer is perfect, i.e., θ = 1. Given that the MNC always prefers a
joint venture to duopoly competition when W ≥ π j − π d (the case of perfect credit markets),
by continuity, it also prefers a joint venture to duopoly competition when W is close to
πj − πd.
Let us now consider another extreme value for W , viz., W = 0. At this value of W ,
the MNC prefers joint venture if and only if
Πm = [π j + (1 − s)α2 V 2 ] − (1 − s)2 α2 V 2 /2 − πd > π m ,

or

π j − π d − π m > s2 α2 V 2 /2.

(D.1)
(D.2)

When α2 V 2 = 0, from Proposition 3, we know that (D.2) holds at θ = 1, i.e.,
Πm − π m > 0.
Let us now look Πm − π m when α2 V 2 is very large. Substituting (36) for s provides


q
s
2 2
(π j + α V ) − (π j )2 + 2α2 V 2 π d + α4 V 4 .
s α V /2 =
2
2

2

2

Notice that (π j +α2 V 2 )−

(D.3)

p

(π j )2 + 2α2 V 2 π d + α4 V 4 < π j −π d since (π j )2 +2α2 V 2 π d +α4 V 4 >

(π d + α2 V 2 )2 . That is, the coefficient s on the right hand side of (D.3) is always a finite
number. From (36) using (16), it can be shown that s converges to 0 as α2 V 2 converges to
infinity. Thus the right hand side of (D.3) converges to 0 as α2 V 2 converges to infinity. It
then follows that the left hand side of (D.3), viz., s2 α2 V 2 /2, also converges to 0 as α2 V 2
converges to infinity. Hence, (D.2) holds when α2 V 2 converges to infinity.
From proposition 6, we know also that Πm − π m is a U-shaped function of α2 V 2 = 0.
Thus, if Πm −π m never takes a negative value, then of course joint venture is always preferred
to duopoly (and βL = βH ). However, this cannot be guaranteed. Since Πm is at its minimum
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when α2 V 2 = π j . Condition (D.2) becomes
π j − π d − π m > s2 π j /2
at α2 V 2 = π j . From equation (36), we also know that s|W =0,
Substituting s|W =0,

α2 V 2 =π j

(D.4)

α2 V 2 =π j

= 2 − (1 + 2π d /π j )1/2 .

into s2 π j /2, we can show that π j − π d − π m < s2 π j /2 at cd = cm

and cd = (a + cm )/2. That is, it is possible that for some parameter values there exists two
values βL and βH where 0 < βL ≤ βH such that the MNC always prefer joint venture if
α2 V 2 6 βL or α2 V 2 > βH but prefer duopoly competition if βL < α2 V 2 < βH .10 However,
we cannot rule out the possibility that βL = βH so that duopoly is never preferred.
Since profits for the MNC is an increasing function of W (proposition 5), βL and βH
converges to each other as W increases, and coincide when W is sufficiently close to π j − π d .
2

10
It can be shown that µ would still be less than 1 when α2 V 2 = βH as long as either α is sufficiently
small or V is sufficiently large.
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